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Abstract The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use
investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical sup-
port. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in
the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elim-
ination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic
advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the
Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even
without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the
incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant
advantage. Nevertheless, we fin strong evidence that forward induction affects
the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that play-
ers perceive that the firs mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit
capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this
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perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework
for dynamics.
Keywords Entry · Capacity investment · Experiment · Forward induction ·
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JEL Classificatio Numbers C70 · C91 · D42 · L11 · L12
1 Introduction
Theoretical industrial organization has argued, formally since Dixit (1980) and
intuitively since Bain (1956) and Modigliani (1958), that investment in capac-
ity can be used to deter entry into markets. This issue has received considerable
attention in the literature, as one of the leading instances of the importance of com-
mitment in sequential games. Discussions of Dixit (1980) appear in virtually all
the teaching manuals in the area (see e.g. Tirole 1989; Basu 1993; Martin 1993;
Vives 1999). Despite this, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firm
actually invest in capacity to deter entry. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) provide a the-
oretical rationalization of this fact. The specifi model they put forward involves
a different sequence of moves of the incumbent and the entrant than the one pro-
posed by Dixit, as well as a partially-recoverable capacity or entry cost and the
use of forward induction to select among several equilibria. The main result is that
forward induction rules out the equilibria where the incumbent invests in capacity;
as a result, the incumbent does not retain the whole market.1
We conduct experiments to test the extent to which this explanation is sat-
isfactory and, more generally, to shed light on the strategic interaction between
incumbents and entrants. Our work is an instance of the kind of interplay between
theory and data that experiments make possible. The empirical validity of the
Bagwell-Ramey prediction hinges on the extent to which participants in a labora-
tory follow the logic of forward induction.2
In this respect, the results from previous experimental studies on forward
induction – reviewed in Sect. 3 – are mixed. We use two stylized games inspired
by the game in Dixit (1980) and the game in Bagwell and Ramey (1996), hereafter
B–R. In our Dixit entry game, only the incumbent may pre-commit. In this envi-
ronment we fin a substantial rate of entry deterrence through pre-commitment,
with the incumbent generally reaping the monopoly profit In our B–R game, an
incumbent and a potential entrant make decisions in three stages. First, the incum-
bent may partially pre-commit to a given level of capacity. Then the entrant has the
same choice, having observed the incumbent’s choice. In the third stage both firm
simultaneously decide whether to compete in the market, by then paying (the rest
of) the capacity cost.
In our context, an entrant who pre-commits production must be signaling that
she intends to become the monopolist, as pre-committing and then not produc-
ing is a dominated strategy. The entrant could have avoided pre-committing so as
1 For a discussion of the Bagwell-Ramey model see also Vives (1999).
2 For other examples of experimental work on theroretical industrial organization issues see
Davis and Wilson (2000), Rustichini and Villamil (2000) and Abrams et al. (2000).
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not to lose the pre-committed cost; in anticipation of this, the incumbent does not
pre-commit. Thus, in this game the possibility of partial pre-commitment together
with the logic of forward induction takes away the advantage that the incumbent
has in the standard entry-deterrence model.
We fin that the full B–R prediction does not hold in our laboratory data. We
fin that there is only limited pre-commitment by either the incumbent or the
entrant, and, contrary to the prediction, the incumbent becomes the monopolist
three times as frequently as the potential entrant. An explanation of the tilt towards
the incumbent may be found in a commonly-held belief by many players that the
firs mover has a strategic advantage, and thus should become the monopolist in
the post-commitment game. Nevertheless, we also fin evidence that the choice of
whether or not to participate in the market is significantl affected by the pre-instal-
lation decisions made, so that there is some appreciation of the notion of forward
induction.
The quite moderate level of pre-commitment in our B–R design data is indeed
suggestive, as it is consistent with the fiel evidence. However, in what sense is it
consistent with the more frequent use of pre-commitment in the Dixit treatment?
Perhaps the world is more like the B–R environment, involving pre-commitment
by both firm and partially recoverable costs; nevertheless, behavior in the Dixit
treatment may help us to understand behavior in the B–R environment. The pre-
conception of the first-m ver advantage may be the starting point in both cases: in
Dixit the pre-commitment signal is a rather clear one and, hence, is used more fre-
quently; it may be perceived as the way to drive home the point of the incumbent’s
first-m ver advantage. In contrast, in B–R the meaning of the combined signals
may seem open to interpretation, and so pre-commitment is used less frequently.
The perceived first-m ver advantage is only part of our explanation of the
results. Even if players were boundedly rational, one might expect that the oppor-
tunity to play the game repeatedly could lead players to avoid dominated strategies,
at least after enough time of play. An initial perception of a first-m ver advantage
would then vanish over time. It is, however, well known that learning or evolu-
tion does not always lead to limiting outcomes that respect the iterated deletion of
weakly-dominated strategies.3 We provide some results that explain why the initial
pattern of play is not driven out. We show theoretically that our game has outcomes
that do not satisfy the iterated-deletion logic, but are asymptotically present under
dynamics where better-performing strategies grow faster than worse-performing
ones.
2 Implementation
2.1 The Dixit game
In our Dixit game, there are two firm that can produce a homogeneous good with
constant, and equal, marginal cost. Production requires some initial investment;
the total cost of this is F . The game has two stages: In the firs stage, the incumbent
makes an observable capacity pre-installation decision: whether or not to irrecov-
erably sink a fraction a < 1 of the fi ed cost of production F . In the second stage,
3 See, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Samuelson (1997), Vega-Redondo (1996).
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No pre-installation Incumbent Pre-installs
Entrant Entrant
Out In Out In
Out 0, 0 0, 1 Out -aF, 0  -aF, 1 
Incumbent Incumbent
In 1, 0   -F, -F In 1, 0  -F, -F
Fig. 1 Subgames in Dixit sessions
the two firm simultaneously make a decision on whether to compete in the mar-
ket. This decision involves paying whatever portion remains of the full fi ed cost;
thus, even if the incumbent has not pre-committed, it can still pay F in the second
stage. The second-stage competition is in prices; as a result, if both firm decide to
actually pay the full capacity cost, the resulting price will be equal to the marginal
cost. If only one of them chooses to pay the whole cost, then the outcome will be
the monopoly outcome.
This process is illustrated in the two subgames shown in Fig. 1, with monopoly
profit normalized to 1. We label the action where a player does not (does) pay the
whole investment cost in the third stage as “Out” (“In”). Earnings from Bertrand
competition in the market are zero so that if both firm enter the market they both
earn -F . Inaction leads to zero profits
In both subgames, the action pairs (Out,In) and (In,Out) are the only (pure-strat-
egy) Nash equilibria.4 Given this, there are a variety of pure-strategy subgame-per-
fect Nash equilibria in this game. However, some of the outcomes are not possible
under subgame-perfection with pure strategies. The incumbent can guarantee itself
zero profit by not pre-committing and then choosing Out in all subgames; thus, the
incumbent cannot obtain -aF in equilibrium. Also, since the action pairs (Out,Out)
and (In,In) are not pure-strategy equilibria in any subgame, the profi pairs (0,0) and
(-F, -F) cannot occur as part of a pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
But either of the two profi pairs (1,0) and (0,1) is consistent with subgame
perfection. Intuitively, if both firm believe that the incumbent will be the win-
ner in the second stage, this leads to a Nash equilibrium where the incumbent is
a monopolist in the second stage and the entrant chooses to not pre-commit and
stays out of the market. The reverse happens if the firm believe that the entrant
will ‘win’ after all first-stag outcomes.
Matters change under certain refine equilibrium notions of subgame perfec-
tion, which select a unique equilibrium from the set. The forward-induction argu-
ment pertains to the incumbent’s pre-installation decision: The incumbent can
guarantee himself a payoff of 0, independently of what the entrant does, by not pre-
installing and then choosing Out. Any strategy under which a player pre-installs and
then chooses Out is weakly dominated, as it would yield a lower payoff. When the
entrant observes a pre-commitment by the incumbent, he must conclude that the
incumbent will play In, and so responds optimally with Out. As a consequence,
the incumbent will always (optimally) pre-commit, and then play In. Therefore, by
forward induction, only the outcome (In,Out) is plausible.
The corresponding reduced-normal form is shown in Table 1; it further illus-
trates the selection rationale presented above. The reasoning we present holds for
all positive values of a and F . We chose a = 1/2 and F = 1, transforming the
4 We will examine mixed strategies in detail in Sect. 5.
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Table 1 The Dixit game in reduced-normal form
OO OI IO II
NO 60,60 60,60 60,120 60,120
NI 120,60 120,60 0,0 0,0
PO 30,60 30,120 30,60 30,120
PI 120,60 0,0 120,60 0,0
payoffs by adding 1 to each payoff and then multiplying every payoff by 60. The
incumbent (entrant) is the row (column) player. P (N) denotes pre-installation (no
pre-installation). The letters O and I stand for Out and In.
We can also solve the game using the iterated deletion of weakly-dominated
strategies. Note that strategy PO, the incumbent pre-committing and then choosing
Out, is strictly dominated by strategy NO. With PO eliminated, the entrant has two
weakly-dominated strategies: OI (by OO), and II (by IO). Once these have been
eliminated, strategies NO and NI are weakly dominated by PI. This strategy cor-
responds to the incumbent pre-installing and then choosing In. So the prediction
is again that the incumbent will pre-commit and keep the market.
2.2 The B–R game
In our B–R game there are also two firm that can produce a homogeneous good
with constant, and equal, marginal cost. In the firs and second stages, the incumbent
and the entrant make sequential and observable capacity pre-installation decisions.
After observing the incumbent’s choice in the firs stage, the entrant then chooses
between the same two options. In the third stage, the two firm simultaneously
make a decision on whether to compete in the market. Thus, even if a fir has not
pre-committed, it can still pay F in the third stage.
There are four possible pre-commitment combinations; Fig. 2 presents the four
possible subgames for our B–R sessions using a general payoff representation with
monopoly profit normalized to 1. As for the Dixit game, earnings from Bertrand
competition in the market are zero so that if both firm enter the market they both
earn -F and inaction leads to zero profits
In our B–R game, forward induction gives the second mover an advantage. The
argument goes as follows: At the time of pre-commitment an entrant can guarantee
No Pre-installation Entrant pre-installs
Entrant Entrant
Out In Out In
Out 0, 0 0, 1 Out    0, -aF     0, 1 
Incumbent Incum bent
In 1, 0   -F, -F In    1, -aF -F, -F
Incumbent pre-installs Both pre-install 
Entrant Entrant 
Out In Out In
Out   -aF, 0 -aF, 1 Out -aF, -aF  -aF, 1 
Incumbent Incum bent
In 1, 0   -F, -F In    1, -aF -F, -F
Fig. 2 Subgames in Bagwell–Ramey sessions
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himself a payoff of 0 by not committing and then choosing Out. Thus, any strat-
egy under which a player pre-commits and then chooses Out is ‘irrational’, as it
yields a lower payoff.5 Thus, according to the forward-induction logic, since the
entrant does not play ‘irrational’ strategies, when the incumbent observes a pre-
commitment by the entrant, he must conclude that the entrant intends to become the
monopolist and will play In, and so the incumbent will respond optimally with Out.
As a consequence, the entrant will always (optimally) pre-commit, and then play In.
In contrast, pre-commitment does not have the same signaling value for the
incumbent firm An incumbent that pre-committed could, mistakenly, have believed
that the entrant was not going to pre-commit (thus, expecting to become the monop-
olist). So, when faced with the unambiguous subsequent pre-commitment choice
of the entrant, the incumbent should yield and leave the monopoly profit to the
entrant. An incumbent who has not pre-committed has an even stronger reason to
yield in front of a pre-committed entrant. In anticipation of all this, the incumbent
does not pre-commit and leaves the market to the entrant. Therefore, by forward
induction, only the outcome (Out,In) is plausible.
The corresponding reduced-normal form is shown in Table 2. Once again, we
chose a = 1/2 and F = 1, and we then transformed the payoffs by adding 1 to each
payoff and then multiplying every payoff by 60. In this Table, the firs letter (N or
P) of the three-letter groups in the leftmost column refer to whether the first-m ver
pre-installed, while the next two letters (O or I) refer to whether the firs mover then
competed the market if the entrant did or did not pre-install, respectively. The firs
two letters of the four-letter groups in the top row refer to whether the second mover
chose to pre-install, conditional on whether the firs mover pre-installed; the last
two letters refer to whether the entrant then conditionally competed in the market.
The iterated deletion of weakly-dominated strategies leads us here to the same
prediction as does forward induction, that the entrant wins the market with or
without pre-committing, and the incumbent does not pre-commit. The interested
reader can work through the procedure or can fin a detailed description in Brandts
et al. (2005). It is worth mentioning that, even with just two rounds of deletion of
dominated strategies, the entrant can guarantee his favorite outcome (Out,In), as
all the equilibria in the game that remain after two rounds of deletion produce that
outcome.
As we have seen, in our case the forward-induction rationality requirements
imposed by Bagwell and Ramey are relatively mild. Players should avoid weakly-
dominated strategies, and their opponents should be aware of this and take it into
account when making their decisions.6,7
5 More precisely, it is weakly dominated. In general, definition of rationality under payoff
uncertainty will imply that players do not use weakly-dominated strategies; see, e.g. Dekel and
Fudenberg (1990) or Börgers (1994).
6 An alternative definitio by Van Damme (1989), p. 485) states that when: “player i chooses
between an outside option or to play a game G of which a unique (viable) equilibrium e∗ yields
this player more than the outside option, only the outcome in which i chooses G and e∗ is played
is plausible.” It is easy to see that this (stronger) notion yields the same result in this game.
7 We should also note that there are a variety of subgame-perfect equilibria; in some of them
the incumbent pre-commits. For example, suppose both agents expect (Out,In) in all of the sec-
ond-stage subgames when the incumbent does not pre-commit, and they expect (In, Out) if the
incumbent pre-commits. Then, it is optimal for the incumbent to pre-commit. Similarly one can
construct subgame-perfect equilibria with the entrant pre-commiting, as well as with no agent
pre-commiting.
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3 Previous experimental literature
One may think that most people will not be able to follow the kind of logic that for-
ward induction involves. However, a number of experimental studies report results
that are favorable to forward induction. Cooper et al. (1992) analyze experiments
involving a choice between an outside option for one of the players and a 2 × 2
coordination game, with two Pareto-ranked equilibria. They analyze the case where
forward induction and a simple dominance argument lead to the same prediction,
and their results are consistent with this kind of forward-induction concept. Cooper
et al. (1993) present results from an experimental game, where there is an outside
option for one of the players and a symmetric Battle-of-the-Sexes game is played
if this outside option is foregone. When forward induction coincides with simple
dominance the results are again consistent with these notions. However, in a second
treatment, an outside option that does not dominate one of the other choices in the
Battle-of-the-Sexes affects play in the same manner as an outside option that does
dominate.
Van Huyck et al. (1993) consider an experimental setting in which players
participate in an auction for the right to play a coordination game. Their results
exhibit two key features: The price in the auction is high enough for a forward
induction argument (different from dominance here) to select the Pareto-efficien
equilibrium, and subjects’ play in the coordination game actually selects this equi-
librium. Broseta et al. (2003) report evidence favorable to forward induction in an
experiment in which subjects firs bid in an auction and subsequently play a game
with several equilibria. The results presented in Brandts and Holt (1995) support
forward induction in a very simple game where it is equivalent to the elimination
of dominated strategies, but not in two more demanding environments.
There is also evidence that suggests that forward induction is not an impor-
tant behavioral force. Schotter et al. (1994), Nagel (1995), Capra et al. (1999) and
McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) study experimental games for which the application
of iterated dominance selects one outcome and obtain results that are not consistent
with the predictions of the iterated dominance argument. Balkenborg (1998) reports
results from a game in which backward induction yields an outcome different from
that resulting from forward induction arguments; less than 20% of all outcomes
are consistent with the forward-induction outcome.
Overall, it seems that the jury is still out on the matter. We are still far from
having delineated the circumstances under which forward induction is and is not
consistent with people’s behavior in the laboratory. Only a large accumulation of
studies will make it possible to obtain a global view on the empirical usefulness of
forward induction. Given this context, we feel it is useful to study the predictive
validity of forward induction in an environment that is of interest in relation to an
important issue in industrial organization.
4 Experimental design & results
4.1 The experiments
We conducted our sessions at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Recruiting
was accomplished via announcements posted in university buildings; participants
8
included students in economics, business, law, political science, and the humani-
ties. There were 12 (different) people in each of three Dixit sessions and six B–R
sessions, or 108 participants in all. There were two separate groups of six in each
session (although this was not mentioned); this separation ensures two completely-
independent observations for each session, for the purpose of statistical tests.
A session consisted of 25 periods in which people were matched and randomly
re-matched in pairs, within the six-person subgroups. People received their earn-
ings over the 25 periods played in a session, with nominal payoffs re-normalized for
experimental purposes. Average payoffs for the 2-h sessions were around 2,500
pesetas, including a show-up fee of 500 pesetas (at the time, $1 exchanged for
approximately 180 pesetas).
We allowed participants’ roles to change, re-drawing these each period. We
felt that this scheme offered the best chance for people to experience each role
and perhaps to understand the subtleties involving the strategic relations between
the two firms We note that abstract terms were used, rather than labels such as
“incumbent” and “entrant”.8
Our games were played using the strategy-elicitation method. This means that
the incumbent had to choose whether to pre-install or not and also whether to
complete the investment or not for each of the entrant’s possible pre-installation
decisions in the second stage. Similarly, the entrant had to make a pre-installation
decision for the incumbent’s two possible pre-installation decisions, as well as a
complete investment decision for the two possible resulting pre-installation deci-
sions of the two players. Essentially, participants submit strategies for the reduced
normal-form game, as they do not have to say what they would do at nodes that
cannot be reached given their own strategies.9
In the Dixit sessions, the incumbent stated his choice concerning pre-installa-
tion, as well as his choice (In or Out) in the resulting subgame. The entrant stated a
choice (In or Out) if the incumbent had pre-installed and also if the incumbent had
not pre-installed. After the data for the period was matched up, each participant
was informed of the payoff outcome for that period.
In the B–R sessions play proceeded as follows: Each incumbent stated whether
he wished to pre-install, and also stated a choice (In or Out) for each of the two
cases regarding possible pre-commitment by the entrant. Each entrant made choices
without being informed of the paired incumbent’s choices and stated whether she
wished to pre-install if the incumbent had pre-installed and also whether she wished
to pre-install if the incumbent had not pre-installed. Given her own pre-installation
8 The full instructions can be found in the supplemental materials on the web.
9 We acknowledge that the strategy method is controversial. For example, while Brandts and
Charness (2000) fin that the strategy method does not affect behavior, Brandts and Charness
(2003) fin that punishment levels are twice as high for responses to actual moves compared to
contingent responses (although the treatment effect regarding deception is nevertheless present
in both cases). The trade-off is between the quantity of data that can be gathered and potential
problems with the quality of these data. Our concern here was that we would have very few
observations at certain nodes with direct responses, so we elected to gather information about
complete strategies. In principle, one should expect the strategy-elicitation method to evoke a
more thoughtful response. However, since having one respond to all particular actions by the
player with whom one is matched might well weaken the signaling value of pre-commitment and
require one to make introspective inferences, we feel that the behavioral sensitivity to pre-instal-
lation decisions may represent a lower bound for the effects of forward-induction logic.
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Fig. 3 Dixit outcomes
choices, she also stated a choice (In or Out) for each of the two cases regarding
possible pre-installation by the incumbent.
4.2 Predictions
In our context the most fundamental question is, arguably, which of the two players
captures the market. In line with the discussion in Sect. 2, the models predict that
the incumbent will tend to capture the market in the Dixit game, but that the entrant
will tend to capture the market in the B–R game.10
Regardless of the nature of the market outcomes, if forward induction or the
iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies has any influenc in our exper-
imental games, pre-installation choices should affect firms subsequent decisions
to participate in the market: A fir should be more likely to participate in the
market if it has pre-installed, and less likely to participate if the other fir has
pre-installed.
4.3 Experimental results
Our firs focus is the pattern of market capture and pre-commitment. Figure 3 shows
the total number of occurrences of each of the four possible market outcomes in
each of the subgames in the Dixit sessions.11
Overall the incumbent and the entrant become the monopolists in 69 and 8% of
the cases. Recall that here only the incumbent can pre-install; with pre-installation,
the incumbent becomes the monopolist in 88% and the entrant in only 2% of the
instances. Even without pre-installation, the entrant tends to yield to the incumbent,
who becomes the monopolist 56% of the time, compared to 12% for the entrant.
The firs mover chooses to pre-install 42% of the time. When the incumbent does
not pre-install, incumbent and entrant complete the investment in 75 and 30% of
the cases, whereas with pre-installation these figure are 95 and 5%.
10 Exhaustive non-parametric tests (using group-level data) of formal hypotheses can be found
in Brandts et al. (2005).
11 The distribution for each of the six-person groups in the sessions is shown in the supplemental
web materials.
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Figure 4 displays entry and pre-installation choices over time in the Dixit ses-
sions: IC refers to the rate of incumbent competition, EC refers to the rate of
entrant competition, and IP refers to the rate of incumbent pre-installation. Incum-
bents were increasingly likely to compete in the market in later periods, with the
rate reaching 95% in the last fi e periods. The pre-installation rate also increases
over time, while the rate of entrant competition is relatively stable.
Figure 5 shows the total number of occurrences of each of the four possible
market outcomes in each of the subgames in the B–R sessions.12
Most of the outcomes (61%) involved the subgame in which neither fir has
chosen to pre-install. The incumbent was the only pre-installer 20% of the time,
while the entrant was the only pre-installer 15% of the time. The subgame in which
both firm pre-install was reached less than 5% of the time. Overall, the incumbent
pre-installed 24% of the time and the entrant pre-installed 19% of the time; this
compares with the 42% pre-installation rate in the Dixit sessions.
With respect to market capture, in the B–R games the result is that the entrant
becomes the monopolist only 15% of the time; by comparison, the incumbent
becomes the monopolist in 45% of the cases. Coordination failure is substantial
12 The distribution for each of the six-person groups in the sessions is shown in the supplemental
web materials.
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Fig. 6 Choices over time – B–R sessions
with no one in the market 13% of the time and both players in the market 27% of the
time. Note, however, that together this 40% is still below the rate of coordination
on the incumbent becoming the monopolist.
Is the incumbent’s success achieved through his pre-commitment?13 When
there is no pre-installation, the incumbent becomes the monopolist 48% of the
time (the corresponding figur for the entrant is 12%).14 When only the incumbent
pre-installs, he becomes the monopolist 69% of the time (the corresponding figur
for the entrant when only the entrant pre-installs is 44%), so that pre-commitment
does help the incumbent. Taken together these facts allow us to say that the incum-
bent wins the market frequently and rather effortlessly, more so than the entrant,
in contrast to what theory suggests.
Figure 6 displays entry and pre-installation choices over time in the B–R
sessions:
In this Figure, IC and EC refer to the respective rates of incumbent and entrant
competition, and IP and EP refer to the respective rates of incumbent and entrant
pre-installation. We see a slight upward trend for the incumbent pre-installation
and entry rates over time, while the corresponding rates for the entrant are either
fla or slightly declining over time.
We now focus on different comparisons involving observed frequencies in the
different subgames, which we use to more clearly highlight the degree of support
for the general notion of pre-commitment as a tool for market control. In the B–R
games, we start by observing that the incumbent’s pre-installation has only a minor
impact on the entrant’s pre-installation rate: The entrant chooses to pre-install 17%
of the time when the incumbent pre-installs, compared to 21% of the time when
the incumbent does not pre-install.
At this point one might be tempted to be concerned that the strategic principles
put forward in game-theoretic analysis have no effect. Nevertheless, pre-commit-
ment occurs frequently enough in our data to warrant an examination of how firms
pre-commitment patterns and their relation to fina participation decisions affect
subsequent choices.
13 In this regard, it is also conceivable that the incumbent may believe that the entrant either
may not be able to carry out the necessary rounds of iterated deletion or that the entrant believes
that the incumbent, if he pre-installs, is unable to do so. In either case, there may be suff cient
uncertainty about the ‘rationality’ assumption to make Out the prudent choice for the entrant,
particularly if the incumbent pre-installs.
14 Note that the orderings of these percentages (with no entrant pre-installation) is qualitatively
similar to those in the Dixit sessions (56 and 12%, for the respective comparisons).
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Table 3 Dixit market entry, conditional on pre-installation
Incumbent pre-installs? Incumbent’s entry rate (%) Entrant’s entry rate (%)
No 74.7 30.3
Yes 95.2 11.1
Table 4 B–R market entry, conditional on pre-installation
Players pre-installing Incumbent’s entry rate (%) Entrant’s entry rate (%)
Incumbent only 92.1 23.0
Neither 71.7 35.8
Both 46.3 63.4
Entrant only 51.1 87.2
Table 3 shows that the incumbent in the Dixit sessions easily wins the market
even without pre-installation. Nevertheless, we see that an incumbent fir is about
20% points more likely to compete in the market if it pre-installs, while an entrant is
about 20% points less likely to compete in the market if the incumbent pre-installs:
Table 4 shows the proportion of eventual entry (choices of In) into the market
for each player in the B–R sessions, contingent on pre-installation decisions. We
observe the following pattern: When only one of the players pre-installs that player
completes the investment more frequently and, hence, can be thought of having an
advantage in capturing the market. When neither pre-installs the incumbent com-
pletes the investment more frequently than the entrant; when both pre-install, the
investment rate is somewhat higher for the entrant.
Notice also that a player is most likely to enter the market when she alone
has pre-installed and is much less likely to invest when only her counterpart has
pre-installed. Market-entry rates are at intermediate levels when neither player
pre-installs or when both players pre-install. The only reversal in the ascending
(or descending) pattern in a column occurs because incumbents who have pre-
installed are more likely to be deterred from market entry than incumbents who
did not pre-install (and who may be oblivious to notions of forward induction).
While the aggregate choices of both roles were affected by pre-installation deci-
sions, this may just not be enough to yield the B–R predictions, since the rate of
entrant pre-installation is low.
4.4 Tests of statistical significanc
While we cite summary statistics for our data, we must be careful when performing
a statistical analysis, given the 25 observations for each participant and the high
degree of interaction within each group. Since each group never interacts with any
other, we can use group-level data to conservatively test for patterns regarding fir
captures of the market. In the Dixit sessions, the incumbent became the monopolist
more frequently (overall) than did the entrant in all six of the groups. A simple
two-tailed binomial test find behavior this extreme to be significan at p = 0.031;
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which considers the magnitude of the differences
across groups as well as the direction, rejects this as random behavior at p = 0.004.
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Table 5 Probit regressions for market entry: marginal effects
Dixit B–R
Incumbent Entrant Incumbent Entrant
Preinstall 0.173** – 0.165*** 0.498***
(0.076) – (0.045) (0.041)
Other Preinstall – −0.049 −0.278*** −0.170***
– (0.061) (0.051) (0.063)
Round 0.011*** 0.002 0.007*** −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 450 450 900 900
Number of subjects 36 36 72 72
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.004 0.076 0.132
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by groups
* significan at 10%; ** significan at 5%; *** significan at 1%. The dependent variable is the
market-entry decision
Thus, there is also a strong tendency for the incumbent to capture the market in the
Dixit environment, in this case as predicted by forward induction.
In the B–R sessions, we fin that the incumbent became the monopolist more
frequently (overall) than did the entrant in 11 of the 12 groups. A two-tailed bino-
mial test find this significan at p = 0.013, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
rejects this as random behavior at p = 0.004, but in the direction opposite to that
predicted by the Bagwell and Ramey model. There is a significan tendency for the
incumbent to control the market, rather than the entrant.
To identify the effect of own (and other) pre-installation on one’s market-entry
decision, we perform probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the group
level.15 The marginal effects for the Dixit and B–R games are reported in Table 5.
There is always a significan marginal effect from pre-installation, particularly
for the entrant in the B–R sessions. There we also observe a significan and negative
marginal effect from the other player choosing to pre-install. In the Dixit sessions,
an entrant is less likely to enter the market if the incumbent has pre-installed, but
this effect is not statistically significant Thus, it appears that pre-installation gen-
erally affects the choices regarding market entry. Incumbents are more likely to
enter over time, while there is no significan trend for entrants.
5 Strategies and dynamics
5.1 Strategy choices
Our results may appear puzzling given the theoretical discussion in Sect. 2. After
all, the solution via forward induction (or deletion of dominated strategies) looks
sensible. One obvious explanation is that the rationality of experimental subjects
is lower than what is necessary for achieving the theoretical outcome. But one may
wonder just how irrational these agents are. Up to now we have provided a rather
synthesized view of the results. Since we elicit strategies for each player, to obtain
a more in-depth view of subjects’ behavior we can also examine the frequency of
15 Our results were robust to a variety of specifications including other choices for clustering.
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Table 6 Strategy frequencies and ex post expected earnings
Incumbent Strategies Entrant Strategies
Strategy Frequency Exp. Earnings Strategy Frequency Exp. Earnings
Dixit sessions
NI 0.433 80.0 OO 0.576 60.0
PI 0.400 102.5 IO 0.278 42.8
NO 0.147 60.0 OI 0.089 37.2
PO* 0.020 30.0 II 0.058 17.9
Bagwell–Ramey sessions
NII 0.333 64.1 NNOO 0.422 60.0
NIO 0.192 70.9 NNII 0.123 30.0
NOO 0.178 60.0 NNIO 0.122 42.3
PII 0.152 81.6 PNIO 0.069 59.0
PIO 0.072 80.0 PPII 0.062 54.0
NOI 0.053 51.0 NNOI 0.052 47.7
POI 0.011 36.4 PNII 0.028 46.7
POO* 0.008 30.0 NPIO 0.022 55.0
NPII 0.021 37.4
NPIO* 0.021 35.0
PPIO* 0.019 51.7
PNOO* 0.011 37.3
NPOO* 0.010 52.7
PPOI* 0.008 32.3
PPOO* 0.006 30.0
PNOI* 0.003 25.0
*Indicates that a strategy is at least weakly dominated in the f rst round of iterations. The strat-
egy PNIO, for example, means the entrant pre-installed and played In if the incumbent didn’t
pre-install, but didn’t pre-install and played Out if the incumbent did pre-install
play for each strategy, as well as its expected earnings. Table 6 displays this infor-
mation for the B–R and Dixit sessions, where strategies have been ordered by the
frequency of their choice. Expected incumbent (entrant) profit are calculated using
the observed frequencies of entrant (incumbent) strategies in the population.16
While the predicted strategies are not always the most frequently-chosen ones,
there is nevertheless a strong positive relationship between a strategy’s profitabilit
and how frequently it is chosen, particularly for entrant strategies. The Spearman
rank-order correlation coefficien (see Siegel and Castellan 1988) between fre-
quency of use and the profitabilit of entrant strategies in the B–R sessions is
rS = 0.5258, significan at p = 0.018 on a one-tailed test. In the Dixit sessions,
profitabilit and frequency are in perfect positive alignment, as would happen with
an ex ante probability of p = 0.042. The correlation for the incumbents is a bit
weaker, but is still marginally significant the Spearman test gives a positive correla-
tion that is significan at p = 0.054 and p = 0.100 in the B–R and Dixit sessions,
respectively, despite the few observations. Note that no strategy that is at least
weakly dominated in the firs round of iterations is ever played more frequently in
its category than any strategy not weakly dominated in the firs round.
16 The number of times each strategy was chosen in each group is shown in the supplementary
material on the web.
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5.1.1 Dixit sessions
The incumbent strategy that should be played according to forward induction in
the Dixit sessions is PI, pre-install and compete in the market. This strategy is
very profitable yielding over 85% of the maximum feasible profi of 120, and is
played 40% of the time; there is a clear positive trend as well.17 The most common
incumbent strategy is NI, the one that presumes that the first-m ver has the advan-
tage even without pre-installing. This policy provides a payoff that is substantially
lower than the payoff from playing PI. NO, the safe strategy, is chosen with an over-
all frequency of 14%, but with a strong downward trend. The strictly-dominated
strategy, PO, is only played with frequency 2% and appears to be vanishing.
The predicted entrant strategy in the Dixit sessions is the safe one, OO. Defer-
ring to the incumbent is by far the most common strategy and is easily the most
profitabl strategy; it also gets decidedly more popular over time. Strategy IO,
deferring if the incumbent pre-installs but competing otherwise, is played about
one-quarter of the time even though its expected payoff is poor. The other two strat-
egies are rarely played. Thus, in the relatively simple Dixit game, we see behavior
largely operating in concordance with the forward induction prediction.18
5.1.2 B–R sessions
The two incumbent strategies that should be played according to forward induction
are NOO and NIO. NOO, the completely safe strategy, is chosen almost 18% of
the time. NIO is played 19% of the time, and does best of all the no-pre-installation
strategies. So the incumbent strategies consistent with B–R equilibrium are played
37% of the time.
The most common incumbent strategy is NII; choosing NII is consistent with
the simple view that everyone knows that the firs mover has the advantage. Nev-
ertheless, the firs mover could increase own payoffs by choosing NIO, avoiding
the market if he observes pre-installation by the second player. He would earn
even more by just pre-installing and playing PIO or, even better, PII. Pre-installing
really clears the way for the incumbent’s market dominance here. The most profit
able incumbent strategy, PII, is chosen 15.2% of the time (with an increasing time
trend). PIO instead avoids the market if the second player pre-installs, and offers
a very good expected payoff; it is chosen 7% of the time. Finally, NOI, POO, and
POI are played with such low frequencies that one may view them as errors or
experiments.
The most common entrant strategy is the completely safe NNOO, which con-
sists of never pre-installing and always staying out of the market. It was chosen
more than three times as frequently as any other strategy; in fact this strategy pays
the best ex post. The next-most-common entrant strategies are NNIO and NNII.
17 The time trends for this and other strategies in the Dixit and B–R sessions can be found in
Brandts et al. (2005).
18 The quantal-response equilibrium model proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) has
been used successfully to explain behavior in a variety of games (see Goeree and Holt 2001.
Here the results of the simulations performed by Gambit show that it does a moderately good
job of explaining behavior, since it predicts behavior consistent with forward induction. More
precisely, it predicts the incumbent will choose strategy PI, and the entrant will mix between
strategies OO and IO with equal weights.
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While NNIO (don’t pre-install in either case, choosing In if and only if the incum-
bent does not pre-install) seems not unreasonable, it receives an expected payoff
of only 42.3, since 72% of the incumbents choose In in subgame AC. It is better
to play PNIO, as fewer incumbents choose In when the entrant pre-installs; this
is nearly as profitabl as the safe strategy and is played 7% of the time. NNII, the
pure second-mover advantage play, does quite poorly, with an expected payoff of
30.0.19
Why doesn’t the iterated elimination work in the B–R sessions? It appears from
our data that subjects do largely avoid weakly-dominated strategies. Recall that the
only dominated strategy for the incumbent is POO. For the entrant, there are seven
strategies that are dominated in the firs round and none of these are played very
often. The highest frequency is 2.1%; collectively this is 7.8%, which is still quite
low, particularly when one considers that they might have been used to test the
response of the incumbent to different modes of pre-commitment.
But, crucially for the lack of empirical success of the B–R predictions, the
subsequent round of deletion fares much more poorly in the data.20 The firs and
the fourth most used strategies for the incumbent are NII and PII (frequencies 33.3
and 15.2%), which are dominated if the firs round of deletion goes through. So
given that those strategies dominated in the firs round are used so rarely, how do
these relatively-common other strategies survive? The answer is that the strate-
gies for the entrant that make this domination apparent are also quite infrequent.
Hence, a pre-conception, like the notion of the firs mover having an advantage can
completely stall the progress of iterated deletion. But even if agents are (mildly)
boundedly rational, it may be possible for them to learn to avoid dominated strat-
egies via the repeated interaction. In Sect. 5.2 we will formally show that this
argument is misleading.
5.2 Dynamics
We mentioned earlier that it is now widely recognized that learning by boundedly
rational agents does not necessarily eliminate weakly-dominated strategies. As the
intuitive arguments suggest, under learning or evolution a strategy that does worse
than another one will tend to be observed less frequently. But if the strategy against
which the dominated strategy does poorly is also decreasing over time (so that the
advantage of the dominating one becomes smaller as well), the decrease of the
19 The quantal-response equilibrium model proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) has
been used successfully to explain behavior in a variety of games (see Goeree and Holt 2001).
We have applied it to both our Dixit and B–R games, using simulations performed by Gambit
(http://econweb.tamu.edu/gambit). In the Dixit case, the QRE model does a moderately good
job of explaining behavior, since it predicts behavior consistent with forward induction. More
precisely, it predicts the incumbent will choose strategy PI, and the entrant will mix between
strategies OO and IO with equal weights. However, it is not a good predictor of behavior in the
B–R game, as it predicts that the incumbent will mix equally between strategies NOO and NIO
and the entrant will mix between PPII, PNIO, PPIO and PNII, with larger weights on the firs
two strategies. Gambit computes QRE by choosing errors independently from an extreme value
distribution with parameter λ. If one leaves complete freedom in the error distribution, QRE can
match any observed frequency distribution of play (as shown in Haile et al. 2003).
20 This is in line with previous experiments and simulations (e.g., Nagel 1995; Roth and Erev
1995) that indicate that people are limited in their ability to work through many levels of iterated
removal.
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dominated strategy will be slower and slower, so that it can stabilize at a positive
level.
We now show, more formally within a deterministic-dynamics framework, that
the equilibria with iteratively-dominated strategies can survive in the long run under
learning in this game.21
5.3 Deterministic dynamics
We must firs introduce some notation: Let Si be the set of pure strategies for an
agent i and si be a generic member of that set. Let S−i be the set of strategies for
the opponent of i and s−i be a generic member of that set. The payoff function for
agent i will be denoted by ui (si , s−i ). For mixed strategies, let xi ∈ i be a mixed
strategy for agent i , where i is the simplex that describes player i’s mixed-strat-
egy space, and let xsii be the probability assigned by the player i to strategy si . We
will use the standard (somewhat abusive) convention to denote payoffs for mixed
strategies, so that ui (xi , x−i ) is the expected payoff for player i when using mixed
strategy xi against mixed strategy x−i .
We formalize the behavior of each player in terms of the mixed strategy he
adopts at each point in time, so the vector x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t)) will describe the
state of the system at time t ,22 define over the simplex  = 1 × 2 of which
0 is the relative interior.
Assumption d.1 The evolution of x(t) is given by a system of continuous-time
differential equations:
x˙
si
i (t) = Dsii (x(t)).
We require that the autonomous system satisfie the standard regularity conditions;
i.e. D must be (i) Lipschitz continuous with (ii) si ∈Si D
si
i (x(t)) = 0. Furthermore,
D must also satisfy the requirements in the following two assumptions:
Assumption d.2 D is a regular (payoff) monotonic selection dynamic. More explic-
itly, let gi (si , x(t)) ≡ x˙ sii (t)/xsii (t) denote the growth rate of strategy si . Then, for
all si , s′i and all x(t), it must be true that gi (si , x(t)) is a Lipschitz continuous
function and that:
sign
[
gi (si , x(t)) − gi (s′i , x(t))
] = sign[ui (si , x−i (t)) − ui (s′i , x−i (t))
]
.
Assumption d.2 merely says that a strategy that has a higher payoff, given the cur-
rent state of the population grows faster (decreases more slowly) than a strategy
with a lower payoff.
21 Deterministic dynamics can (and perhaps should) be interpreted as limits of stochastic
dynamics for large populations (Cabrales and Ponti 2000) or for slow adaptation (Börgers and
Sarin 1997). For this reason, we also performed simulations, using experience-weighted attraction
learning (Camerer and Ho 1999), a stochastic learning model, with small populations and short
time-horizons. These simulations share several qualitative features with our data. For example,
they show that also in this environment iteratively weakly-dominated strategies can survive for
the duration of our experiment. Readers interested in the simulations may consult (Brandts et al.
2005).
22 As is common in the evolutionary literature (x1(t), x2(t)) can also be interpreted as the pro-
portions of people playing each strategy when a game is repeatedly played by a randomly-matched
large population.
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Assumption d.3 x(0) ∈ 0 That is, the initial conditions are in the strict interior
of the strategy simplex. In other words, all strategies have strictly positive weight
at the outset.23
We will now show that the elements in one of the subgame-perfect equilibrium
components that do not survive iterated deletion are limit points of the dynamics
from some interior solution. To state the theorem we introduce more notation.
Let S∗1 ≡ {N I O, N I I }. The set S∗1 includes all the strategies where the incum-
bent does not pre-commit and then decides to produce when no player pre-commits.
Let S∗2 ≡ {N N O O, N N O I, N P O O, N P O I }. The set S∗2 includes all the strate-
gies where the entrant does not pre-commit if the incumbent does not pre-commit
and then decides not to produce.
Proposition 1 Assume that the initial weight on strategies NII for player 1 and
strategy NNOI for player 2 is sufficiently large, and that for any player i = 1, 2
the initial weight on any strategy s j /∈ S∗i is sufficiently small. Then, for any player
i = 1, 2 and any strategy s j /∈ S∗i we must have that limt→∞ x
s j
i (t) = 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
In other words, the equilibrium component where neither player pre-commits,
where the incumbent keeps the market and the entrant yields the market, is a limit
of any trajectory that starts with a sufficientl high weight on strategies NOI and
NNOI and sufficientl small on any strategy s j /∈ S∗i .24
To understand how this proposition works, notice firs that as long as the weight
of NII remains high enough, the payoff for the entrant of strategies in S∗2 is strictly
higher than the payoff for strategies outside that set (by an amount bounded away
from zero). This implies that the growth rate of strategies outside S∗2 is negative
(and bounded away from zero), so they will vanish in the limit. Similarly the payoff
to NOI and NII is strictly higher than that for other strategies of the incumbent if
the weight of NNOI remains high. Now, both NII and NNOI may have a lower
payoff than other strategies, but only against strategies that are vanishing over
time. So, given that the initial weights of NII and NNOI are high enough, they may
decrease, but this rate of decrease is smaller and smaller as time goes by, and they
will never go beyond the threshold where the growth rate of strategies outside S∗2 is
negative. The more delicate part of the proof involves showing precisely that this
is true. In other words, strategy profile in an equilibrium component with itera-
tively dominated strategies can be played even when time goes to infinit provided
the dynamics start close enough to that component. This can happen because the
23 This assumption is a technical necessity because regular dynamics are such that a strategy
with zero initial weight will always have zero weight. So a weakly-dominant strategy will have
no power against dominated ones, when the strategies of other players against which it does
well are never used. This assumption guarantees that the survival of dominated strategies does
not arise simply due to an initial non-existence of those strategies. It also implies, together with
continuity, that all strategies will have positive weight for all t . But as the proposition makes
clear, in the limit the weight of strategies can tend to zero.
24 This is not quite the same as showing that this equilibrium component is asymptotically
stable. Close to one end of the component, trajectories will move away, in the direction another
component. But, as in Binmore et al. (1995), or Cabrales and Ponti (2000), the addition of small
perturbations/mutations, would make the component asymptotically stable.
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strategies against which the ones in the component do badly are vanishing over
time.25
6 Discussion
Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose an alternative model of the timing in the entry
game, in which the ‘first-m ver advantage’ disappears through the logic of forward
induction. They suggest that this is the reason that incumbent firm do not engage
in entry deterrence. In this paper we study behavior in a simplifie version of the
B–R model and compare it to observations from a simpler Dixit-style game. We
fin that in both games the firs mover tends to capture the market, so that the B–R
rationale cannot be the key to explaining the entry-deterrence puzzle.
For the Dixit game the first-m ver advantage is predicted by theoretical argu-
ments. In our data this advantage is strong even when the incumbent does not engage
in entry-deterrence; when the incumbent does pre-install, however, this advantage
is substantially more pronounced. Pre-installation in this game also serves to greatly
reduce inefficien y from 32 to 12%. In the B–R environment, theory suggests that
the entrant should have the advantage, as he or she has the fina opportunity to
pre-install prior to the choices about market participation. Nevertheless, we fin
that the incumbent is much more likely to control the market than the entrant.
This advantage is substantial even without incumbent pre-installation, but grows
considerably when the firs mover pre-installs. We go beyond the purely negative
implication of our results – the rejection of the B–R rationalization – and provide
an explanation for observed behavior.26
Our answer, suggested by some of the regularities that we have just discussed,
is that there is a perceived first-m ver advantage in this game. In the B–R game,
there is a large difference in B–R investment rates (72 vs. 36%) when neither player
pre-commits; note also the difference in these rates when only the other player has
chosen to pre-install, 51.1% for the incumbent versus 23.0% for the entrant. The
investment rate for incumbents is more than double the investment rate for entrants
in both cases. Thus, for most players the pattern is as if the incumbent had a
‘natural’ first-m ver advantage, something not captured by the strategic analysis
presented above. We also see this in the Dixit game, where an incumbent who does
not pre-install nevertheless is nearly fi e times as likely to control the market as
the entrant.
In the B–R game, the strategy in which the incumbent does not pre-install, but
nevertheless enters the market regardless of the entrant’s pre-installation decision,
is by far the most common (chosen fully 1/3 of the time). The logic of forward
25 This proposition only illustrates a theoretical possibility. Even though the strategies that
form the sets S∗1 and S∗2 are chosen over 50% of the time, that equilibrium component does
not characterize well the aggregate behavior of our subjects. Indeed, no equilibrium compo-
nent does. A more accurate analysis of the data from a learning perspective would require esti-
mating or calibrating with a more f exible learning model. The interested reader is referred to
Brandts et al. (2005) where such an analysis is performed using experience-weighted attraction
learning (Camerer and Ho 1999).
26 Of course, we realize that we have not ruled out many other candidate explanations. For
example, one reviewer points out that the normal-form presentation might, under certain not
unreasonable assumptions, lead to a behavioral advantage for the row player. While such an
explanation might well contain a kernel of truth, we have not investigated it in this study.
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induction makes some inroads against an a priori perception of a first-m ver advan-
tage, but generally must surrender to it – the strategy leading to the highest expected
payoff for an entrant in the B–R game involves always staying out of the market.
On the other hand, forward induction and such a perception work together in the
Dixit game, and the incumbent enjoys an overwhelming advantage.27
One may wonder about the origins of a perceived first-m ver advantage. There
are several studies on the topic of the order of play in experimental games. Rapoport
et al. (1990,1993), and Rapoport (1997) fin evidence of a first-m ver advantage
in bargaining games and sequential common resource dilemmas; in the latter case,
earlier movers take larger portions than do later movers. Weber et al. (2004) and
Müller and Sadanand (2003) fin that when simple two-person games that are
‘simultaneous’ in terms of information are played sequentially, the firs mover
tends to do better than when both players make actual simultaneous choices.
Huck and Müller (forthcoming) fin evidence of a first-m ver advantage in a
control treatment in which one player firs selects one of two battle-of-the-sexes
matrices (identical but for labeling); even though this move is in principle irrele-
vant, the likelihood of the firs player’s favored equilibrium increases dramatically,
so that people do not appear to ignore unobserved prior moves. Our environment is
slightly different in that moves are actually simultaneous, even though the partici-
pants are told that the incumbent makes the firs choice about whether to pre-install.
In fact, in our setting the ‘first-m ver advantage’ successfully works against the
ability to perform forward induction that is present to some degree in the popu-
lation. Perhaps there is something general in the psychology of reasoning about
timing that favors earlier movers.28 In any case, there seems to be a widespread
social norm that firs movers have a greater entitlement (as in “the early bird gets
the worm” or “firs come, firs served”).
To obtain a wider perspective on our results, it may be useful to think of equi-
librium selection as simply a coordination problem. Forward induction is a notion
that suggests why certain beliefs might be more plausible than others. However,
other mechanisms for forming beliefs may be more focal for participants; if the
order of play establishes beliefs that are stable, then forward induction may have
little influence 29 One can draw some useful parallels to some previous experi-
mental finding on equilibrium selection. Brandts and Holt (1992, 1993) show, in
27 Our answer to the question why the B–R prediction is not supported by our data requires a
second part. Just to posit the existence of a perceived f rst-mover advantage is not a sufficien
explanation of our data; one must also clarify why learning does not do away with this pre-con-
ception. Our theoretical result with deterministic dynamics provides a rationale for why the initial
behavior does not change too much over time. Thus, it is not simply that people have limitations
in their depth of reasoning. Rather, matters start with a pre-conception that subsequent experience
with the environment is unable to erase.
28 Weber et al. (2004) fin that “virtual observability” (sequential but uninformed versus true
simultaneous) is an important distinction, and suggest that players may be better at reasoning
backward, about events known to have already happened, than reasoning forward; description of
possible outcomes of previously-occurring events is often richer and more complex than descrip-
tion of later-occurring events.
29 Cooper et al. (1997) also provide evidence that stable beliefs may not easily disappear through
adaptation. In their signaling games subjects that had experienced an environment with only a
separating equilibrium remained (after being switched to a game with a pooling and a separating
equilibrium) stuck in that equilibrium rather than reverting the pooling equilibrium to which
inexperienced subjects converge.
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some simple signaling games, that naïve beliefs based on the principle of insuffi
cient reasoning determine initial play, as well as out-of-equilibrium beliefs once
behavior converges to a stable configuration What is particularly interesting in
our environment is that this first-m ver advantage appears to manifest without any
precedence in physical time; it seems that a mere asymmetry in the instructions
generates this effect in the B–R game.
Appendix
Proposition 1 Assume that the initial weight on strategies NII for player 1 and
strategy NNOI for player 2 is sufficiently large. Then, for any player i = 1, 2 and
any strategy s j /∈ S∗i we must have that limt→∞ x
s j
i (t) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1 We firs make precise the assumption on initial conditions
for NI and NNOI. Namely, we assume that.
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Where :
1. The constant K > 0 has the property that gi (si , x) − gi (si , xˆ) ≥ −K
∣∣x − xˆ∣∣
for all i ∈ {1, 2, }x, xˆ ∈ 1 × 2 and it exists by the Lipschitz-continuity of
gi (., .)
2. The constant h(a) > 0 has the property that g2(si , x)− g2(NNOI, x) < −h(a)
whenever, u2(si , x1) − u2(NNOI, x1) ≤ − 454 , and it exists by continuity and
assumption d.2.
3. The constant h(c) > 0 has the property that g1(si , x) − g1(NNOI, x) < −h(c)
whenever, u1(si , x2) − u1(NNOI, x2) ≤ − 152 , and it exists by continuity and
assumption d.2.
We now show that the following statements hold:
(a) For all si /∈ S∗2 , and for all t,
x
si
2 (t) < exp(−h(a)t)
x
si
2 (0)
xNNOO2 (0)
(b) For all t, xNNOI2 (t) >
17
24 .
(c) For all si /∈ {NIO, NII}, and for all t,
x
si
1 (t) < exp(−h(c)t)
x
si
1 (0)
xNII1 (0)
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(d) For all t, xNII1 (t) >
7
8 .
Statements (a) and (d) will establish the proposition. The proof will be done by
contradiction. Suppose that (a) is the statement that stops being true the earliest,
that it does so for strategy si /∈ S∗2 = {NNOO, NNOI, NPOO, NPOI} and that the
boundary time is t ′. Then it must be true that:
x
si
2 (t
′) = exp(−h(a)t ′) x
si
2 (0)
xNNOI2 (0)
.
Note that the payoff for si /∈ S∗2 = {NNOO, NNOI, NPOO, NPOI} against NII is at
most 30, and that otherwise the maximum payoff in this game is 120. Note also that
by (d) and the assumption here, for all t < t ′, xNII1 (t) ≥ 7/8. Then, we must have
that for all t < t ′, u2(si , x1(t)) ≤ 30xNII1 (t)+120(1−xNII1 (t)) ≤ 30 · 78 +120 · 18 =
165
4 , and also that u2(NNOI, x1(t)) ≥ 60(xNOI1 (t) + xNII1 (t)) ≥ 2104 .
Thus, u2(si , x1(t))−u2(NNOI, x1(t)) ≤ − 454 , which implies that g2(s2, x(t))− g2(NNOI, x(t)) < −h(a) for all t < t ′. Then, by integrating, we have that
x
si
2 (t
′)
xNNOI2 (t
′) < exp(−h(a)t ′)
x
si
2 (0)
xNNOI2 (0)
, which implies xsi2 (t
′) < exp(−h(a)t ′) x
si
2 (0)
xNNOI2 (0)
xNNOI2 (t
′) ≤ exp(−h(a)t ′) x
si
2 (0)
xNNOI2 (0)
, a contradiction. 	unionsq
Suppose, then, that (b) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that it
does so for strategy si and that the boundary time is t ′. Then it must be that:
xNNOI2 (t
′) = 17/24. As before, we will reach a contradiction, but before we will
prove the following:
Claim For all si ∈ {N N O O, N P O O, N P O I }
gi (NNOI, x(t)) − gi (si , x(t)) ≥ −2K (1 − xNOI1 (t) − xNII1 (t)).
Proof of Claim For all si ∈{NNOO, NPOO, NPOI}, since u2(si , xˆ1))=u2(NNOI,
xˆ1), for all xˆ1 such that xˆNIO1 + xˆNII1 = 1, we have that gi (NNOI, xˆ1(t)) =
gi (si , xˆ1(t)). So, by Lipschitz-continuity we have that for all x1
gi (NNOI, x(t)) − gi (NNOI, xˆ(t)) ≥ −2K
∣∣x1(t) − xˆ1(t)
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gi (si , xˆ(t)) − gi (si , x(t)) ≥ −2K
∣
∣x1(t) − xˆ1(t)
∣
∣
But since gi (NNOI, xˆ(t)) = gi (si , xˆ(t)), adding the previous two inequalities
yields the result. 	unionsq
Now, by the claim, gi (NNOI, x(t)) − gi (si , x(t)) ≥ −2K (1 − xNOI1 (t) −
xNII1 (t)), but by assumption, for all t < t
′xsi1 (t) < exp(−h(c)t) x
si
1 (0)
xNII1 (0)
for all si /∈
{NIO, NII} so that
gi (NNOI, x(t)) − gi (si , x(t)) ≥ −2K
(
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)
.
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Then by integration we have that
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and by adding over all si ∈ S∗2 ≡ {NNOO, NNOI, NPOO, NPOI} we have that:
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where the firs equality is true by the assumption used to reach a contradiction and
the last inequality is true by (a). This yields a contradiction with the assumption
about the initial conditions.
Suppose that (c) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that it does
so for strategy si and that the boundary time is t ′. Then it must be true that:
x
si
1 (t
′) = exp(−h(c)t ′) x
si
1 (0)
xNII1 (0)
.
Note that the payoff for si /∈ S∗1 = {NIO, NII} against NNOI is at most 60,
and that otherwise the maximum payoff in this game is 120. Note also that by
(b) and the assumption here, for all t < t ′, xNNOI2 (t) ≥ 17/24. Then, we must
have that for all t < t ′, u1(si , x1(t)) ≤ 120(1 − xNNOI2 (t)) + 60 · xNNOI2 (t) ≤
120 · 724 + 60 · 1724 = 1552 and also that u1(NII, x1(t)) ≥ 120 · xNNOI2 (t) ≥
120 · 1724 = 1702 . Thus, u1(si , x2(t)) − u1(NII, x2(t)) ≤ − 152 , which implies that
gi (si , x(t))−gi (NII, x(t)) < −h(c) for all t < t ′. Then, by integrating, we have that
x
si
1 (t
′)
xNII1 (t
′) < exp(−h(c)t ′)
x
si
1 (0)
xNII1 (0)
, which implies xsi1 (t
′) < exp(−h(c)t ′) x
si
1 (0)
xNII1 (0)
xNII1 (t
′)
≤ exp(−h(c)t ′) x
si
1 (0)
xNII1 (0)
, a contradiction.
Suppose, then, that (d) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that
it does so for strategy si and that the boundary time is t ′. Then it must be that
xNII1 (t
′) = 7/8. As before, we will reach a contradiction, but before doing so we
will prove the following:
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Claim gi (NII, x(t)) − gi (N I O, x(t)) ≥ −2K
(
1 − ∑si ∈S∗2 x
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2 (t)
)
.
Proof Since u1(NIO, xˆ2)) = u2(NII, xˆ2), for all xˆ2 such that ∑si ∈S∗2 xˆ
si
2 (t) = 1,
we have that gi (NII, xˆ(t)) = gi (NIO, xˆ(t)). So, by Lipschitz-continuity we have
that for all x2
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But since gi (NII, xˆ(t)) = gi (NIO, xˆ(t)), adding the previous two inequalities
yields the result. 	unionsq
Now, by the claim,
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Then, by integration we have that
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we have that
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where the firs equality is true by the assumption used to reach a contradiction and
the last inequality is true by (c). This yields a contradiction with the assumption
about the initial conditions.
Since this exhausts all cases the result follows.
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